



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

all their scattered and imperfect symbols in its one perfect symbol—perfect, because both symbol and the essential truth symbolized, identifying, as it does, the divine with the human mind in its God-man, the Christ.

Until Christianity is thus demonstrated, men who demand the reason of faith will continue to doubt its absolute claims. But whenever this demonstration shall be made popular—as it may be, by press and pulpit, to a public intelligence, which, meanwhile, however, will have to learn other than empirical modes of thought—then our epoch of doubt shall give way to an epoch of holier faith than the world has yet seen—a faith that shall be knowledge, knowledge of the Most High Reason by reason, leaving naught in the universe alien to man, bringing his Heaven down to earth and making every moment of his time eternal with the eternal truths and principles that fill it, rebuilding the Church, now half in ruins, on the firmer foundation, and under the serener sky of his own spirit, with an architecture of thought more ornate and aspiring than was ever typed by cathedral of stone, and for a worship whose silences shall be full of harmony, and whose songs shall seem audible echoes of the voice of God.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN SON.

HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION." THIRD PART, "THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION," II, 3.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

2. The next point is, that the two are identical, this inadequacy (incompatibility) notwithstanding, and that the alienation, the weakness, and frailty of human nature, cannot detract from that unity which is the substantial element in the reconciliation.

We have recognized all this in the divine idea: for the son is other than the father, and this Otherness or Alienation is difference, or it could not be spirit. But the Other is God, and has all the fulness of divine nature in it, and the attribute of alienation does not detract from the fact that this Other is the son of God,

and therefore God; nor does it detract, if the Other has the form of human nature.

This Alienation is eternally annulling itself, eternally positing itself, [and again] eternally annulling itself, and this self-positing and self-annulling of Alienation is Love, is Spirit. The Evil has been defined abstractly to be only what is Alien, the finite and negative, while God, as the good and true, was placed in contrast to it. But this Other, this Alien, contains in itself also the affirmation, and the consciousness must arise in finite being, that the principle of affirmation is contained therein, and that within the principle of affirmation there is implied the principle of identity with the other side. God, as the True, is not only abstract identity with himself, but has the Other, the negation, the positing of himself as an Alien for his own essential category; and these are the peculiar attributes of spirit.

The possibility of Reconciliation lies in the knowledge of the potential unity of the divine and human natures—this is the necessary basis. Through it man may know himself received into God, since God is not Alien to him, and he does not stand in the relation of something external and accidental to God, but can be received into God according to his freedom and subjectivity; this is only possible because in God himself there is this subjectivity of human nature.

The infinite pain must become conscious of this potentiality, and see in it the potential unity of the divine and human natures which, however, exists only as potentiality, as substantiality, so that this weakness, finitude, and alienation do not detract from this substantial unity of the two.

The unity of the divine and human natures, or man in his universality, is the thought of man, and is the in-and-for-itself-existing Idea of Absolute spirit. In the process by which the alienation annuls itself, the idea and objectivity of God are potentially real; they are so, immediately, in all men: "Out of the cup of the entire spirit realm there foams for him infinitude." The pain which the finite feels, in this its cancellation, does not pain, since it rises thereby to a phase of the Divine.

"Can that pain torment or pain us which increases e'er our joy?"

Here, on this stand-point, however, the question is not as to the

thoughts of man. Nor can we stop with the category of particularity in general, which is itself universal and belongs to abstract thinking as such.

3. If the consciousness of the unity of the divine and human natures, or man's determination as man, is to be conveyed at all to man, or if this cognition is to enter into his consciousness of his finitude like a ray of eternal light, shining to him through finitude, this cognition must reach him as man in general—that is to say, without presupposing culture and higher education in him, but it must rather reach him as immediate man, and it must be universal for the immediate consciousness.

The consciousness of the absolute idea which we possess in thinking must be produced not for the stand-point of philosophical speculation or speculative thought, but for mankind in general, in the form of certitude. Men do not possess this idea in the form of thinking, or as a cognition and knowledge of the necessity of this idea, but the essential point is that it shall become a certainty for them, or, in other words, that this idea, the unity of the divine and human natures, shall become a certainty, that it shall assume for them the form of immediate sense-perception or external existence; in short, that this idea shall appear in the world, and be seen and experienced. Therefore, this unity must exhibit itself to consciousness in an entirely temporal and perfectly common phenomenon of reality in a special man—in a special man who is at the same time known as the divine idea, not simply as a superior being, but as the highest, the absolute idea, as the son of God.

Divine and human natures contained in One is a hard and difficult expression; the image-concept usually connected with it should be ignored, however, and we should think of the spiritual essence; in the unity of the divine and human natures everything that belongs to the external particularization, and everything that is finite, has disappeared.

It is the substantial element of the unity of the divine and human natures which enters into the consciousness of man, so that man appears to him as God, and God as man. This substantial unity is the potentiality of man; but, since it is for man, it is above or beyond the immediate consciousness, common consciousness, and knowledge; this removes it from the subjective con-

sciousness, which is the same as common consciousness, and has the same determinations.

This is the reason why this [unity of the divine and human nature] must appear to the others as single, exclusive, man. It appears not in all men singly, but in One from whom they are excluded, but in whom it is no longer a potentiality which remains removed and beyond them, but as a singularity on the plane of sensuous certainty.

It is this sensuous certainty and this appearance appealing to sense-perception which is the salient point, and not merely the divine teacher (who, it should be remembered, was not simply a teacher of morality); neither is the salient point merely that there was once a teacher of this idea, nor is it the image-concept, or the conviction, which is of importance, but the immediate presence and sensuous certainty of the divine are the points in which we are chiefly concerned. For the immediate sensuous certainty of the Presence in time is the infinite form and manner by which the "Is" exists for natural consciousness. This "Is" destroys every vestige of mediation; it is the highest point, the last touch of light which is added to the picture. This "Is" is found in none of the mediations by the feelings, by image-concepts and reasons, and is found only in philosophical cognition through the idea and in the element of universality.

The Divine should not be understood as if it were only a universal thought, or as if it existed only as potentiality; the objectification of the Divine must not be understood as one which is in every man, for in this way it would be conceived as the general multiplicity of the spiritual only. The development which the absolute spirit has in itself, and which must proceed until it attains the form of the "Is," of immediateness, is not contained in that.

The *One* of the Jewish religion exists in thought, and not in sense-perception, and for this reason he has not attained completion and perfection in the form of spirit. Perfection to [the form of] spirit means the subjectivity which objectifies itself infinitely and, from the absolute antithesis, from the extreme point of phenomenality, returns to itself.

Although the principle of individuality had already existed in the Greek ideal, it lacked there that infinity which is in-and-for-itself universal; the universal posited as a universal exists only

in the subjectivity of consciousness; this alone is the infinite movement in itself in which all determinateness of existence is dissolved, and which is at the same time found in the most finite existence.

The individual, then, which is for others the phenomenal manifestation of this idea, is this Single One [this special individual Christ], not several, for with Several the divinity would become an abstraction. Several would be a bad excess of reflection—an excess because it is opposed to the idea of the individual subjectivity. Once, in the idea, is all times, and the subject must turn without choice towards One Subjectivity. In the eternal idea there is but One son, and thus there is but One, to the exclusion of all others, in which the absolute idea appears. This perfection of reality to immediate singularity is the most beautiful feature of the Christian religion, and the absolute transfiguration of finitude is made in it an object of sense-perception.

The doctrine that God must become man, in order that the finite spirit may have the consciousness of God even in finitude, is the most difficult phase of religion. According to a common image-concept, which we find especially among the ancients, the spirit or soul has been cast out into this world as into something foreign to it: its abode in the body and its specialization in an individuality were considered a degradation (lapse) of spirit. There is implied in this the doctrine of the untruth of the merely material side of immediate existence. But, on the other side, immediate existence is at the same time essential, and is the highest culmination of the spirit in its subjectivity. Man has spiritual interests, and is spiritually active; he may feel hampered in it by the feeling of physical dependence, for he must toil for his food, etc., and he is turned away from his spiritual interests by his dependence on nature. The phase of immediate existence is, however, contained in spirit itself. It is the attribute of spirit to unfold into this phase. Naturalness is not merely external necessity, but spirit, as a subject, in its infinite relation to itself, has the attribute of immediateness in itself. Therefore, since it is to be revealed to man what the nature of spirit is, and the nature of God is to become manifest in the entire evolution of the idea, also this form must appear in it, and it is the form of finitude. The divine must appear in the form of immediateness.

This immediate presence in time is naught but the presence of spirit in the spiritual shape, and that is the human one. In no other form is this appearance, or manifestation, a true one—not, for example, the appearance of God in the fiery bush, nor the like manifestations. God appears as single person, and with such immediateness all physical wants and frailties are connected. In the pantheism of the Hindoos innumerable incarnations occur; there the subjectivity, or existence in human shape, is only an accidental form. In God, it is a mask, which Substance assumes and changes at its pleasure accidentally. But God as spirit contains in himself the phase of subjectivity and singularity; his phenomenal appearance can, therefore, be but a single one, and it can occur but once.

Christ has been called by the Church the God-man; it is this monstrous combination which is contradictory to the understanding; but in it man is made conscious and certain of the unity of the divine and human natures, and he sees how the alienation, or, as it may be called, the finitude, weakness or frailty, of human nature is not incompatible with this unity; he is told that in the eternal idea alienation does not detract from the unity, which is God.

This is the monstrous [conception] whose necessity we have seen. It is taken for granted therewith that the divine and human natures do not differ in themselves. God [is] in human form. The truth of it is that there is only One reason, One spirit, and that spirit, as finite, has no true existence.

The essence of the form of phenomenal appearance has been explained. Since it is the phenomenality of God, the phenomenality is essential for the Church. Phenomenality is existence for another, and this other is the Church.

This historical phenomenon may again be considered in two ways. First, as man, according to his external condition, as an ordinary man as he appears to irreligious minds. And then it may be considered in spirit, and with spirit penetrating to its truth, because spirit has in it this infinite diremption, this pain which wills truth, which will and must have the need of truth and its certainty. This is the true mode of contemplation in religion. These two sides must here be distinguished—the immediate contemplation, and that through faith.

Through faith this individual is known to be of divine nature, and with it God is no longer merely something above and beyond—the infinite separation is removed. If Christ is looked upon as we look upon Socrates, he is considered as an ordinary man. In this way the Mohammedans look upon Christ as a messenger of God, and in this way all great men are messengers of God. If a person does not assert more of Christ than that he is a teacher of mankind and a martyr of truth, he does not stand on the Christian stand-point, and not on that of true religion.

The one side is this human side; it is his phenomenality as a living man. An immediate man lives within the limits of every external contingency; he is influenced by all the temporal relations and conditions; he is born, and as a human being he has all the needs and wants of other men. The only difference is that he [Christ] does not become involved in the corruption, the passions, and the special inclinations of other men, nor in the special interests of worldly affairs (although in them also probity and the discipline of instruction may find a place), but he lives exclusively for truth, and to proclaim the truth; his mission is simply to give a content to the higher consciousness of man.

To this human side belongs, in the first place, Christ's doctrine. The question is, How can this doctrine be—how is it constituted? The first doctrine cannot be identical with the doctrine of the Church afterwards; it must have peculiarities which necessarily receive another definition in the Church, or in some cases are entirely set aside. Christ's doctrine, in so far as it is an immediate one, cannot be Christian dogmatics, cannot be the doctrine of the Church. When the Church has become established, and the kingdom of God has achieved its realization and existence, this doctrine can no longer have the same shape as before.

The principal content of this doctrine can only be universal and abstract. When something new—a new world, a new religion, a new idea of God—is to be given within the world of image-conception, the first thing must be the universal basis, the second the special, definite, and concrete. The image-conceiving world, in its thinking, thinks abstractly only—it thinks only the universal; for comprehending spirit it is reserved to know from the universal the particular, and to make the particular rise through itself out of the idea. For the image-conceiving world, the basis of the

universal thought and particularity and development are separated. This universal basis for the true idea of God can, therefore, be set forth through the doctrine [taught in the Church].

Since the aim is a new consciousness of men, a new religion, it takes the form of the consciousness of absolute reconciliation ; with it is conditioned a new world, a new religion, a new reality, a new state of the world, for external being or existence has religion for its substance.

This is the negative polemic side in the consciousness and faith of man against remaining in this externality. The new religion proclaims itself as a new consciousness — consciousness of the reconciliation of man with God ; this reconciliation expressed as a state is the kingdom of God, eternity as a home for the spirit, reality in which God reigns. The spirits, the hearts, are reconciled to him, and it is God who has become king. This, therefore, is the universal basis.

This kingdom of God, the new religion bears in it potentially as a negation of the existing world ; this is the revolutionary side of the doctrine which partly casts aside existing things, and partly annihilates and subverts them. All mortal, worldly things are discarded as valueless, and are pronounced as such. That which has been, now changes ; the previous relations and conditions, the state of religion and the world, cannot remain as before. The aim is to draw man, in whom consciousness of conciliation is to be roused, away from the world, and enjoin upon him this abstraction from the existing reality.

This new religion is as yet concentrated, and does not exist as church, but as the energy which constitutes the sole interest of man, who is struggling and striving to preserve it for himself, because it has not yet been reduced to harmony with the state of the world, and not yet in connection with the world-consciousness.

This first appearance contains, therefore, the polemic side, the injunction of an abnegation of worldly things : it is enjoined that man should rouse himself to the infinite energy with which the universal demands itself to be grasped, and compared with which all other ties must become indifferent to him, and to which all other things otherwise ethical and right must yield.

“ Who is my mother or my brethren ? ” “ Let the dead bury their dead.” “ No man having put his hand to the plough, and

looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." "I came not to send peace, but a sword."

We see expressed in this the polemic struggle with the ethical conditions. "Take, therefore, no thought for the morrow." "Go and sell that thou hast and give to the poor."

All these relations referring to property disappear; but, on the other hand, they bear in themselves their own annulment; if everything is given to the poor, then there are no longer any poor people. These are doctrines, statements, all of which belong to the first beginning, where the new religion is the sole [remaining] interest of which man must apprehend the loss, and when, as a doctrine, it appeals to men that have done with the world, and with whom the world in its turn has nothing more to do. The one side is this renunciation; this forsaking and slighting of all essential interest, and of all ethical ties, forms an essential phase, the concentrated phenomenal appearance of truth, but which at a later time, when truth has secure and firm existence, loses part of its importance. Nay, when this beginning of the suffering shows itself towards the external world only as suffering, resigning itself and offering its neck, its inner energy, by the time it has grown to strength, will culminate in violence just as extreme towards the external.

The next step on the affirmative side is the annunciation of the kingdom of God: into it, as the kingdom of love to God, man must place himself by casting himself immediately into this truth. This is expressed with the uttermost freedom of speech at the beginning of the sermon on the mount, for instance: Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. Such words belong to the greatest ever spoken; they form a final central point which annuls all superstition and all that is unfree in man. It is of infinite importance that through Luther's translation of the Bible a people's book has been put into the hands of all, in which both heart and spirit can find satisfaction in the highest (even in an infinite) manner. In Catholic countries there is a great defect in this respect. In the former [in Germany] the Bible is the means of salvation from all the thralldom of spirit.

No mediation is spoken of [as necessary] for this elevation, or for producing it in man; there is posited therewith, on the contrary, this immediate being, this immediate self-translation into the

kingdom of God. It is the intellectual, spiritual world, the kingdom of God, to which man must belong, and it is will and disposition alone which give worth to him—not abstract disposition, not any particular sentiment or intention, but the absolute disposition which has its basis in the kingdom of God. In this appeared for the first time the infinite value and worth of the inner nature of man.

This is proclaimed in the language of enthusiasm and inspiration, in those thrilling tones which stir the soul and draw it out of the body, as did Mercury, the conductor of souls, leading it from the temporal sphere to the eternal home. "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness!"

There are contained everywhere, in this elevation and total abstraction from all that the world considers great, the melancholy and grief which were felt at the debasement of his people and of man in general. Jesus appeared when the Jewish people, in consequence of the danger to which their form of worship had been exposed, clung to it all the more tenaciously, and were in despair as regards reality, since it had come into contact with a universality of mankind whose existence it could no longer deny, and which, on the other hand, was as yet in itself entirely devoid of spirit; in short, he appeared at a time when the feeling of helplessness and despondency prevailed among the common people: "I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes."

This substantial, this universal, divine heaven, in more definite reflection, leads to moral commands which are the application of that universal to special relations and situations. These commands partly contain only limited spheres, and partly are of no extraordinary value for this stage which concerns itself with absolute truth, or they are contained already in other religions and in the Jewish one. These commandments are all comprised in their centre, the commandment of Love, which has for its aim not the rights, but the welfare of others, and therefore relates to their particularity. "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Taken in the abstract and more extended sense of its scope, as love to man in general, this commandment requires love to all human beings. But thus it is made an abstraction. The human beings whom

we can love, and towards whom love becomes real, are a few particular ones; the heart which is ready to enclose all mankind is naught but an empty inflation into a mere image-concept, which is the opposite of real love.

Love in the sense of Christ is, in the first place, moral love to our neighbor in the special relation in which we stand towards him; above all things, love was to be the relation of his disciples and their successors—the tie through which they are One. And it must not be taken here in the sense that each was to have his special business, interests, and conditions in life, and, in addition to these, was to exercise love, but, in the exclusive, abstracting sense, love was to be the centre in which they lived—their business. They were to love each other—nothing but that—and therefore they were not to have any aim and purpose of particularity, no aims of the family, no political aims, no love for the sake of these particular aims. Love is rather the abstract personality, and the identity of the same in One consciousness where there remains no possibility for particular aims and ends. Besides this love there is, therefore, here, no other objective aim and end. This love, independent and made a central point, becomes, finally, the higher divine love itself.

At first this love, since it is still without any objective aim, is as yet directed polemically against all that exists, and especially against the Jewish existing world. All the actions commanded by the law which men otherwise thought of the highest value to themselves, and which had nothing in common with love, were characterized as dead, vain, and empty activity, and Christ himself heals the sick on the Sabbath day.

In these teachings there appears presently this phase also—this distinction—which, since it is immediately expressed and enjoined in this wise: “Seek ye the kingdom of God,” sink yourself in the truth, appears as if it were expressed subjectively, so to speak, and for this reason the Person [or personality] comes in consideration.

In this relation Christ does not speak merely as the teacher who presents what is his subjective view, and who has the consciousness of his productivity and activity, but rather as a prophet. He is himself immediate, as this injunction is; he speaks this immediately from God, and God speaks this through him.

That the life of spirit is contained in the truth, that it is without mediation, is expressed prophetically in the fact that it is God who says this. The principal element in this is that it is the absolute, divine truth which has being in and for itself; the proclamation of this truth and the will tending in the direction of this truth—which is in and for itself—are represented as the act of God, it is the consciousness of the real unity of the divine will, of its harmony with it. In this elevation of his spirit, and in the certainty of his unity with God, Christ says: Woman, thy sins are forgiven. There that tremendous majesty speaks through him which can make everything undone and thus ordains such events.

This form of expressing it lays the main stress on the fact that he who says this is at the same time essentially man, that it is the son of man who expresses this, and in whom this expression and actualization of self-existent Being, this activity of God, are essentially as in a human being and in whom it does not exist as something superhuman, as something which appears in the form of an external revelation. This divine presence is essentially identical with the human element.

Christ calls himself the son of God and the son of man: this must be taken literally. The Arabs spoke of each other mutually as sons of a certain tribe, kin, or clan; Christ belonged to mankind: this is his kin. Christ is also the son of God: the true sense of this expression, the truth of the idea which Christ was for his church, and the idea of the truth which was in him in his church, might be explained away. It might be said: all the sons of man are children of God, or they should render themselves children of God, and so forth.

Since the doctrine of Christ for itself alone appeals only to the image-conception, to the inner feeling and the heart, it finds a complement in the representation of the divine idea as expressed by his life and fate. The kingdom of God, as constituting the contents of the doctrine, is as yet the universal idea in the form of an image-concept, but through this individual it steps into reality, so that those who wish to attain to that kingdom can do so only through that One individual.

There is, first, the abstract compatibility of the doing, acting, and suffering of this teacher in relation to his own doctrine, the

fact that his life was entirely devoted to it, that he did not fear death, and by his death gave testimony of his faith. That Christ became a martyr of truth stands, therefore, in close connection with this course. Since the founding of the kingdom of God is in a complete contradiction to the existing political state which is based on another mode and determination of religion, the doom (speaking from the human stand-point) of being a martyr of truth stands in connection with his course.

These are the principal points connected with Christ's appearance in human form. This teacher collected friends about him. Christ, since his doctrines were revolutionary, was tried and crucified, and by his death he has thus borne evidence of the truth of his doctrine. So far even unbelief accepts this story; it is quite similar to that of Socrates, but in a different country. Socrates, too, made the consciousness of man realize its inward depths. His *δαιμόνιον* has no other sense than that. He taught also that man should not be satisfied with the commonly accepted authority, but should gain a conviction of its truth personally, and should act according to his conviction. These are similar individualities and similar fates. The internality of Socrates was incompatible with the religious belief of his people and with the constitution of the state, and for this reason he was executed; he, too, died for truth.

Christ lived among a different people, and his doctrine has in this respect another tone, but the kingdom of heaven and the purity of heart contain, nevertheless, an infinitely greater depth than the internality of Socrates. This is the external history of Christ which appears to unbelief in the light in which the history of Socrates appears to us.

With the death of Christ the return-movement of consciousness begins. The death of Christ is the centre round which it turns; in the conception of it lies the difference between external conception and faith; *i. e.*, of contemplation with the spirit, from a spirit of truth, from the holy spirit. According to that comparison, Christ is a human being like Socrates, a teacher who lived virtuously during his life, and who made man conscious of what constitutes the True in general, and what should form the basis for man's consciousness. The higher view, however, is, that in Christ was revealed the Divine nature. This consciousness is

reflected in the general expressions that the Son knows the Father, etc.—expressions which have in the first place a certain universality of their own, and which exegesis can drag over into the field of general consideration, but which faith, by its conception of Christ's death, receives in its truth; for faith is essentially the consciousness of absolute truth, of what God is in-and-for-himself. We have seen, however, what God is in-and-for-himself: he is this history of a life, this Trinity, in which the universal places itself over against itself, and is therein identical with itself. In this element of eternity, God is self-concatenation, the linking together of himself with himself. Faith alone has the consciousness, and conceives that in Christ this in-and-for-himself existing truth is viewed in its process, and that by him alone this truth has been revealed.

It is only with this contemplation that the religious element, as such, arises, in which the divine itself is an essential phase. In the friends, acquaintances who had [thus] been taught, there arise a foreboding, an image-concept of and a desire for the new kingdom, for a new heaven and a new earth; this hope, this certainty, has cut its way through the reality of their hearts, and in the reality of their hearts it has taken root.

The suffering of Christ, however, his death, has annulled the human relationship of Christ, and it is in this death that the transition to the religious side appears; everything depends there on the meaning, on the manner of looking upon this death. On the one side it is the natural death, caused through injustice, hatred, and violence. But it is already established in the hearts and minds that the relevant point is not morality in general, not the thinking and willing of the subject within and without, but that the interest lies in an infinite relation to God—to the God who is present; it is the sensuous certainty of the kingdom of God, a satisfaction, not on the moral nor the ethical side, nor in conscience, but a satisfaction besides which nothing that is higher exists, and which is absolute relation to God himself.

All other modes of satisfaction imply that they exist according to some determination of a subordinate kind, so that the relation to God remains a something that lies beyond and above, something distant, or perhaps something that does not exist at all. The fundamental determination of this kingdom of God is the

presence of God, and thus to the people of this kingdom not only love to man is recommended, but they are conscious also that God is Love.

In this it is expressed that God is present, and that this must exist as one's own feeling, as self-feeling. The kingdom of God, the presence of God, is this determination. For this determination the certainty of the presence of God is necessary. Since the subject has, on the one side, a need or a feeling, it must, on the other side, distinguish itself from the latter; it must distinguish from itself this presence of God, but in such a way that this presence of God is manifest to it. This manifest certainty can exist here only in the mode of sensuously appearing phenomenality.

The nature of the eternal idea itself is to exhibit the determination of subjectivity immediately as a real one, distinguished from a mere thought. On the other side, it is the faith arising out of the sorrow of the world, and resting on the evidence of faith, which in this explains to itself the life of Christ. His doctrine, his miracles, are conceived and understood in this evidence of faith. The story of Christ has also been related by those upon whom the Holy Ghost had descended. The miracles are conceived and related in that spirit, and the death of Christ has been comprehended in it in its truth to mean, that, in Christ, God and the unity of divine and human natures have been revealed. Death is, then, the touchstone, so to speak, on which the value of faith is tested, since it shows how faith essentially understands the meaning of the phenomenality of Christ. The death has in the next place the meaning that Christ was God-man, the God who had also human nature, even unto death. It is the fate of human finiteness that it must die; thus death is the highest proof of humanity, of absolute finiteness; and, moreover, Christ died the intensified death of the criminal; not only natural death, but even the death of shame and dishonor, on the cross; humanity appeared in him even to the extreme point.

As regards this death, stress must be laid, in the first place, on a particular aspect, namely, its polemic side towards the external. Not only the renunciation of natural will is therein placed before us, but with it all peculiarity, all interests and aims towards which the natural will may tend, all eminence and whatever the world esteems—all these are lowered therewith into the tomb of the

spirit. This is the revolutionary element by which an entirely different form is given to the world. But in the renunciation of the natural will this finite element, the alienation, is at the same time glorified and transfigured. For alienation has a wider scope besides that of immediate naturalness and a further determination. It is an essential attribute of the existence of the subject that it should be for others also; the subject is not merely for itself, but it also exists as the image-conception of others; it exists, and is valid and objective, just in the measure in which it can make itself felt by others and valued by them. Its validity is the conception of the others, and rests on the comparison with what they esteem, and with what is valued by them, as its essential nature. Since death, besides being natural death, is also the death of the felon, the ignominious death on the cross, there is not only natural death in it, but also the social dishonor, the disgrace before the world; the cross is transfigured; that which is the lowest in conception, that which the state intends for a disgrace, is raised to the highest position. Death is natural; every man must die. When the cross has been elevated so as to become a standard—a standard whose positive content is at the same time the kingdom of God—then the innermost disposition of the mind, the heart, is withdrawn in its deepest recesses from the life of society and state, and their substantial basis is removed, so that the whole structure is no longer a reality, but an empty phenomenon which will soon crash and tumble into ruin, and which must in its existence also manifest the fact that it has no longer any essential being in it. The imperial power, for its part, dishonored everything that enjoyed respect and authority among men. The life of each individual was subject to the caprice of the emperor, which was limited by nothing externally or internally. But, besides life, all virtue, dignity, age, position, sex, everything—was thoroughly dishonored. The slave was the highest power after the emperor, or perhaps had more power than even he; the senate dishonored itself in the same way in which it was dishonored by the emperor. Thus the majesty of worldly government, as well as all virtue, right, dignity of institutions and relations, the majesty of everything that has validity for the world, was dragged into the mire. Thus the worldly ruler of the earth, on his part, degraded the highest to the lowest, and radically per-

verted man's disposition, so that there was nothing within to be opposed to the new religion, which, on its part, had for its standard the change of what was in greatest contempt to the highest position. All that was fixed, ethical—all that was established in public opinion as valid and powerful—was destroyed, and, for the existing world against which the new religion turned, nothing was left but death—the quite external, cold force, which the disgraced Life, feeling itself infinite within, then indeed no more dreaded.

Here a new consideration appears. God has died, God is dead—the most dreadful thought is that nothing that is eternal, nothing that is true, has existence, that negation exists in God himself; the highest pain, the feeling of the perfectly helpless despair, the renunciation of all higher principle, is connected with it. The process, however, does not end here, and now the return movement begins; for God maintains and preserves himself in this process, and the latter is but the death of death. God arises again to life; there is, therefore, a change to the opposite.¹ The resurrection thus essentially belongs to faith: Christ appeared after his resurrection only to his friends; this is not external history for unbelief, but this apparition is for faith alone. The resurrection is followed by the transfiguration [ascension] of Christ, and the triumph of the elevation to the right hand of God closes this history, which, conceived in this way, is the self-explication of the divine nature. If in the first sphere we conceived God in pure thought, this second sphere begins with the immediateness which exists for sense-perception and for sensuous representation. The nature of the process here is that the immediate individuality

¹ This refers to the resurrection and the ascension of Christ. In the same way in which all the rest, so far, has become a [sensuous] phenomenon for the immediate consciousness, in the manner of [objective] reality, this elevation takes this form as well: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." In this way there exists for sense-perception this death of death, the victory over the grave, the triumph over the negative, and this elevation to heaven. The subjection of the negative is not a mere stripping off of human nature, but its highest proof and vindication even in death and in the highest love. Spirit is spirit only as the negation of the negative, which therefore contains the negative in itself. Hence, since the Son of Man sits at the right hand of the Father, there is placed before the spiritual eye in this elevation of human nature, in the most marked way, the dignity and worth of the same, and its identity with the divine nature.—(From the manuscript of the lectures of 1821, written by Hegel himself.)

is annulled: in the same manner in which, in the first sphere, the self-seclusion of God ceased and his first immediateness, as abstract universality, according to which he is the essence of all beings, was cancelled, there is in this sphere the abstraction of [his] humanity annulled, the immediateness of existing individuality, and this is done by death; the death of Christ, however, is the death of death itself, the negation of the negation. We have found the same course and process of the explication of God in the realm of the father; here, however, it is found in so far as it is the object of consciousness. For there existed the natural desire for perceiving the divine nature through sense-perception. Finally, in the death of Christ the phase should be emphasized that it is God who has killed death by passing through it and coming out of it; with all this finitude, humanity and humiliation are posited as an alien element in Christ, since he is strictly God: it becomes evident that finitude is foreign to him and assumed from another; this other is the human beings who stand over against the divine process. It is their finitude which Christ has assumed—this finitude in all its forms, and which in its extreme point is the evil or bad. This humanity, which in itself is a phase in the divine life, is now determined as an alien, as something not belonging to God. But this finitude, in its being for itself in relation to God, is the evil—it is something alien to him; but he has assumed it to put an end to it through his death. The ignominious death, as the gigantic union of these absolute extremes, is in this at the same time infinite love.

Infinite love is manifested in that God has posited himself identical with what is alien to him in order to put it to death. This is the signification of the death of Christ. Christ has borne the sins of the world, has reconciled it to God, so we are told.

This death is not only extreme finitude, but also the annulment of natural finitude, of immediate existence, and of alienation—it is the removal of constraint. This annulment of the natural must be essentially conceived in the [category of] spirit to be the movement of spirit by which it comprehends itself, and to ascend to the natural by death. It is therefore the abstraction from immediate will and immediate consciousness, and it is the sinking of the Ego into its own self, and out of this mine it brings forth only its determination, its true being, and its own absolute universality.

What is valid for spirit, what is of value, it can realize only in this annulment of its natural being and will. The suffering and the grief of this death that contains this element of reconciliation of the spirit with itself and with what spirit is in itself, this negative element which belongs only to spirit as such, is the inner conversion and transformation. But death is here not represented in this concrete signification; it is represented as natural death, for, when joined to the divine idea, the negation in question can have no other representation. If the eternal history of spirit is represented externally in the natural, then the evil which is actualized in the divine idea takes on the form of the natural, and its subversion appears only as natural death. The divine idea can proceed no further than to this realm of the natural. This death, however, although a natural one, is the death of God, and thus it is satisfaction and atonement for us since it represents the absolute history of the divine idea, that which happened in itself, and which eternally happens.

In order that individual man may be able to do, achieve, or accomplish anything, it is necessary that the thing be in accordance with its idea. The fact, for instance, that a certain criminal can be punished by the judge, and the fact that this punishment is the execution of and atonement to the law, is not owing to the judge, nor to the criminal suffering his punishment as a particular external occurrence, but it is due to the nature of the thing, the necessity of its idea. Thus we have this process in a twofold form before us: Once in thought, in the representation of the law, or in the idea, and, secondly, in a particular case, and in this particular case the process is as the nature of the thing causes it to be; and without the latter neither the action of the judge, nor the suffering of the criminal, would be the punishment and the satisfaction of the law. The ground, the substantial element, is the nature of the thing.

Such is also the case with that atonement for ourselves; *i. e.*, the principle which underlies it, that this atonement took place in and for itself: not a foreign sacrifice or victim has been offered, not another has been punished, in order that there should be some punishment. Every man must out of his own subjectivity or guilt be that or do that which he is commanded or destined to be; but what he is thus for himself must not be contingent and acciden-

tal, not his arbitrary will, but it must, on the contrary, be a truth. If he therefore produces this conversion and the renunciation of his natural will in himself, and is within [the commandment of] love, then this is the thing in and for itself. His subjective certainty and feeling is truth; it is the truth and the nature of spirit. That history [of Christ] is therefore the ground of redemption, for it is the thing in-and-for-itself; it is not an accidental, individual deed or event, but it exists in truth and perfection. The confirmation of its truth lies in the fact that that history [of Christ] presents itself in a form which can be grasped by the senses, and through which the individual can comprehend the merit of Christ. It is not the history of an individual, but it is God who brings this to pass; *i. e.*, it is the sense-intuition or sense-perception of the fact that this is universal history—history existing-for-itself.

Other forms, as, for instance, that of the expiatory death, with which the idea is connected that God is a tyrant calling for victims or sacrifices, reduce themselves to what has been said, and are set right by it. Sacrifice means: to annul the naturalness of alienation. It is further said: Christ has died for all; this is not an individual thing, but the divine, eternal history. It means, likewise, that all have died in him. In the nature of God this too is a phase; it has taken place in God himself. God cannot be satisfied through another, but only through himself. This death is love itself, posited as a phase of God, and this death is reconciliation. In it absolute love is seen through sense-perception. It is the identity of the divine and the human, since God is in the finite in himself, and this finite, even in death, is a determination of God. God has reconciled the world by death, and reconciles it eternally with himself. This return out of estrangement is his return into himself; by this he is spirit, and the third is therefore that Christ has arisen from the dead. The negation is conquered thereby, and the negation of the negation is thus a phase of the divine nature.

Suffering and dying in this sense is contrary to the doctrine of moral imputation according to which every individual is for himself, and each is the doer of his deeds. The fate of Christ seems to contradict this imputation; but the latter has a place only in the scope of finitude, where the subject stands as an individual person, and not in the scope of the free spirit. On the plane of

finitude it is a principle that everybody remains what he is; if he has done what is bad, he is bad: wickedness is in him as his quality. But in morality, and still more in the sphere of religion, the spirit is known to be free and to be affirmative in itself, so that the constraint in him to do evil and wickedness is null and void for the infinity of spirit: spirit can make undone what was done; the deed remains in recollection, it is true, but the spirit washes the sinner clean. Imputation; therefore, does not extend to this sphere. In the death of Christ the finitude of man has been put to death as far as the true consciousness of spirit is concerned. This death of the natural has thus general significance: the finite, evil, is annihilated in general. The world has in this way been reconciled, and its evil in itself has been taken from the world by this death. There enters in this way in the true understanding of death the relation of the subject as such. The mere contemplation of history here ceases; the subject itself is drawn into the process; it feels the pain of evil and of its own estrangement, which Christ has taken upon himself by assuming humanity, and which by his death he has annihilated.

This relation of the content is the religious side, and in this begins the origin of the Church: this content is identical with what has been called the pouring out of the holy spirit. It is the spirit which has revealed this; the relation to mere man changes into a relation which is changed and transformed by spirit, so that the nature of God discloses itself therein in the way that this truth receives immediate certainty and the form of phenomenal manifestation.

He who in the first place was considered teacher, friend, and martyr of truth, assumes through this an entirely different position. So far it is only a beginning, which will be led by spirit to the result, to the end, to truth. Christ's death is, on the one side, the death of a man, of a friend who died through violence; but it is this death which, if spiritually understood, becomes salvation, and becomes the centre of reconciliation.

It was only after the death of Christ that it was disclosed to his friends that they had had before their eyes the sense-perception of the nature of spirit, and that they had looked with their senses upon the satisfaction of the needs of spirit. The conviction, therefore, which they could have derived from his life was not yet

the exact truth, but this was to be obtained only through the spirit.

Previous to his death he was among them as an individual perceptible to their senses. The proper solution was given to them by that spirit of which Christ said that it would guide them to all truth. "When he, the spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth."

With this his death becomes in this respect that death which forms the transition to glory and glorification, which, however, is naught but the rehabilitation of the original glory. Death, the negative, is the mediation by which the original glory is posited as attained. With this begins the history of the ascension of Christ and his elevation to the right hand of God, the point where this history begins to be spiritually conceived.

With this, then, it came to pass that the little Church had received sensuous confirmation that God is manifested as man; this humanity in God, and the most abstract form of it, the greatest dependence, the greatest weakness, the extreme stage of frailty—this is what natural death means.

"God himself is dead," runs that Lutheran hymn; this consciousness expresses that the human, the finite, the frail element, the weakness and negation, are themselves phases of the divine, that they are in God himself; that the alienation, the finite, the negative, is not outside of God; that, as alienation, it does not prevent the union with God. Alienation, or negation, is known as a phase of the divine nature itself! The highest cognition of the nature of the idea of spirit is contained therein.

This external negative element changes in this wise to an internal one. Death, on the one side, has this signification and meaning, that with it humanity is stripped off and the divine glory appears again. But death is at the same time the negative, the last extreme of what man, as natural existence, and, consequently, God, is subject to.

Through this whole process men have arrived at the consciousness—and this is the truth which they have attained—that the idea of God has received sensuous confirmation for them that the Human is the immediate, present God, and, more particularly, that in this history, as the spirit conceives it, there is contained the representation of the process of what man is and what spirit

is. God in himself and dead, this mediation by which the human is stripped off; and, on the other side, Being-in-itself returns to itself, and thus only becomes spirit.

The consciousness of the Church, which thus makes the transition from mere man to God-man, to [the idea addressed to] sense-perception, to consciousness, to the sensuous confirmation of the unity and union of the divine and human natures—this is what the Church begins with, and what constitutes the truth upon which the Church is based.

The explication of the reconciliation is, then, that God is reconciled with the world, or, rather, that God has shown himself as being reconciled with the world, and that the Human is not something alien to him, but that this alienation or differentiation, the finitude, as it has been expressed, is a phase within himself. It is true that it is but a vanishing phase, but in this phase he showed himself and revealed himself to the Church.

This is, for the Church, the history of the manifestation of God; this history is the divine history, by which man has become conscious of truth. From it the consciousness, the knowledge arose that God is the triune.

The reconciliation, which is implied in the belief in Christ, has no meaning, if God is not known as the triune, if it is not cognized that he IS, but that he is also as the other, as self-differentiation, as the alien, and in such a manner that this alien is God himself, that it has in it divine nature in itself, and that the annulment of this difference, of this alienation, that this return, this love, is the spirit.

In this consciousness it is contained that faith is not the relation to something alien, but that it is relation to God himself. These are the phases which are of importance here, that man arrives at the consciousness of the eternal history, the eternal movement, which is God himself.

This is the exposition of the second idea, as the idea in its phenomenal manifestation, of the exposition of the manner in which the eternal idea has arisen for the immediate sensuous certainty of man; or, in other words, how it became manifested. The certainty to which it attains for man is necessarily sensuous certainty, but a sensuous certainty which at the same time makes the transition to spiritual consciousness, and which is also con-

verted into immediate sensuousness, but in such a manner that there can be seen in it the movement and history of God, the life which is God himself.

HEGEL ON THE STATE.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT," BY E. D. MEAD.

B. The Foreign Relations of the State.

547. By war, the independence of the State is put in jeopardy. But the mutual acknowledgment of free individual nations is effected (by war) and through treaties of peace, which are to be lasting, this general acknowledgment, as well as the special rights of peoples in their mutual relations, is established. The foreign relations of the State are governed partly by these positive tracts, containing, however, in so far, only laws which lack true actuality; partly by the so-called rights of nations, whose general principle is the presupposed acknowledgment of the States, and which, therefore, sets such bounds to their otherwise unrestrained dealings with each other that the possibility of peace remains; it also distinguishes individuals as private persons from the state; and it rests in general on established usage.

C. The World-History.

548. The particular national spirit, since it is real, and its freedom exists as nature [unconscious usage], has, through this natural side, the moment of geographical and climatic influences; it is in time, and has, according to the content, essentially a special principle, and must pass through a development of its consciousness, and of its reality, determined by that principle; it has a history of its own. As circumscribed spirit, its independence is a subordinate one; it passes over into the general world-history [*i. e.*, it loses itself in the process of the World-History], whose events represent the dialectic of the special national spirits, the judgment of the world [*i. e.*, the verdict of History on the validity of what is contributed by each nation].